Ideas from 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic' by David Lewis [1968], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' by Lewis,David [OUP 1983,0-19-503204-7]].

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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke]