Ideas from 'Truth-makers and dependence' by David Liggins [2012], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysical Grounding' (ed/tr Correia,F/Schnieder,B) [CUP 2012,978-1-107-02289-8]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist