Ideas from 'Properties' by David M. Armstrong [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
In most sets there is no property common to all the members
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
19. Language / A. Language / 6. Predicates
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability