Ideas from 'Universals' by David M. Armstrong [1995], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to Metaphysics' (ed/tr Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest) [Blackwell 1995,0-631-19999-3]].

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things