Ideas from 'Universals' by David M. Armstrong [1995], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to Metaphysics' (ed/tr Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest) [Blackwell 1995,0-631-19999-3]].

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness