Ideas from 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)' by David M. Armstrong [1968], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' by Armstrong,D.M. [Routledge 1993,0-415-10031-3]].

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser