Ideas from 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)' by David M. Armstrong [1968], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' by Armstrong,D.M. [Routledge 1993,0-415-10031-3]].

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Robinson,H]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Lycan]
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Heil]