Ideas from 'Truth and Truthmakers' by David M. Armstrong [2004], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Truth and Truthmakers' by Armstrong,D.M. [CUP 2004,0-521-54723-7]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Naturalism
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. States of Affairs
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are not powers - they just have powers
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced