Ideas from 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' by David M. Armstrong [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' by Armstrong,D.M. [Routledge 1993,0-415-10031-3]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Behavioural Dispositions
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 1. Physicalism
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types