Ideas from 'Emotivism' by David O. Brink [1995], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy' (ed/tr Audi,Robert) [CUP 1995,0-521-48328-x]].

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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it?
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements