Ideas from 'Thinking about Consciousness' by David Papineau [2002], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Thinking about Consciousness' by Papineau,David [OUP 2004,0-19-927115-1]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
We canít decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjuntional properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 1. Physicalism
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 2. Reduction of Mind
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 5. Causal Argument
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
19. Language / B. Meaning / 3. Meaning as Verification
Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
19. Language / C. Semantics / 1. Semantics
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
19. Language / C. Semantics / 5. Possible Worlds Semantics
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs