Ideas from 'Sameness and Substance' by David Wiggins [1980], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sameness and Substance' by Wiggins,David [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12846-8]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Ordinary Language
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / p. Counting
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed….
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Singling out extends back and forward in time
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork'
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities
Identity is primitive
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself!
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept')
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us