Ideas from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by David Wiggins [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by Wiggins,David [CUP 2001,0-521-45619-3]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Conceptual Analysis
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 8. Criterion for Existence
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can forget about individual or particularized essences
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences are not explanations, but individuations
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Not every story corresponds to a possible world
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by essence
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / c. Knowing kinds
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds