Ideas from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by David Wiggins [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by Wiggins,David [CUP 2001,0-521-45619-3]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Conceptual Analysis
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 8. Criterion for Existence
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can forget about individual or particularized essences
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences are not explanations, but individuations
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Not every story corresponds to a possible world
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by essence
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / c. Knowing kinds
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds