Ideas from 'Truth and Predication' by Donald Davidson [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Truth and Predication' by Davidson,Donald [Belknap Harvard 2005,0-674-01525-8]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There is nothng interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The concept of truth can explain predication
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth