Ideas from 'Mental Events' by Donald Davidson [1970], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Essays on Actions and Events' by Davidson,Donald [OUP 1982,0-19-824637-4]].

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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Maslin]