Ideas from 'Mental Events' by Donald Davidson [1970], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Essays on Actions and Events' by Davidson,Donald [OUP 1982,0-19-824637-4]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described