Ideas from 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' by Duncan Prichard [2012], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' by Pritchard,Duncan [OUP 2012,978-0-19-870896-1]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
An improbably lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence