Ideas from 'Mental Files' by François Recanati [2012], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mental Files' by Recanati,François [OUP 2012,978-0-19-965999-9]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Mental Files
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Concepts
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
19. Language / C. Semantics / 2. Fregean Semantics
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
19. Language / C. Semantics / 6. Indexical Semantics
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
19. Language / C. Semantics / 7. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 1. Reference theories
There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
19. Language / E. Propositions / 3. Types of Proposition
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication