Ideas from 'Value Theory' by Francesco Orsi [2015], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Value Theory' by Orsi,Francesco [Bloomsbury 2015,978-1-47253-292-3]].

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change
20. Action / B. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same
Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / e. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent