Ideas from 'Value Theory' by Francesco Orsi [2015], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Value Theory' by Orsi,Francesco [Bloomsbury 2015,978-1-47253-292-3]].

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent