Ideas from 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' by Frank Jackson [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' by Jackson,Frank [OUP 2000,0-19-825061-4]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water'
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
24. Applied Ethics / A. Decision Conflicts / 1. Applied Ethics
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide