Ideas from 'Truthmakers' by Fraser MacBride [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [ ,-]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker. Reductio suggests it can't have
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind')
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours