Ideas from 'The Case against Closure (and reply)' by Fred Dretske [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)' (ed/tr Steup/Turri/Sosa) [Wiley Blackwell 2014,978-0-470-67209-9]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication