Ideas from 'The Will to Power (notebooks)' by Friedrich Nietzsche [1888], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Will to Power' by Nietzsche,Friedrich (ed/tr Kaufmann,W /Hollingdate,R) [Vintage 1968,0-394-70437-1]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity'
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Only because there is thought is there untruth
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / d. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts'
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things'
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!)
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful)
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / d. Altruism
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself?
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences!
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. ‹bermensch
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"?
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy'
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice')
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals
25. Society / B. The State / 8. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide
25. Society / C. Social Justice / 3. Social Equality / b. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things
27. Natural Reality / F. Biology / 3. Evolution
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class