Ideas from 'Principia Ethica' by G.E. Moore [1903], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Principia Ethica' by Moore,G.E. [CUP 1980,0-521-09114-4]].

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 2. Goodness / a. Goodness
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 2. Goodness / b. Candidates for the Good
The three main values are good, right and beauty
22. Metaethics / B. Basis of Ethics / 6. Right
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good
22. Metaethics / B. Basis of Ethics / 7. Moral Motives
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action
22. Metaethics / C. Sources of Ethics / 3. Intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them