Ideas from 'The Causal Theory of Names' by Gareth Evans [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Collected Papers' by Evans,Gareth [OUP 1985,0-19-823627-1]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs