Ideas from 'Thought' by Gilbert Harman [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Thought' by Harman,Gilbert [Princeton 1977,0-691-01986-x]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Inference is never a conscious process
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Deductive logic is the only logic there is
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form
Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts
Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Belief / e. Belief holism
You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Memory
Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Self-Knowledge
We see ourselves in the world as a map
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Behavioural Dispositions
Defining dispositions is circular
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 4. Connectionism
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Mentalese
Are there any meanings apart from in a language?
19. Language / A. Language / 4. Ambiguity
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form
19. Language / B. Meaning / 1. Meaning
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory
19. Language / B. Meaning / 11. Synonymy
There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning
19. Language / C. Semantics / 4. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions
19. Language / E. Propositions / 4. Support for Propositions
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition
19. Language / F. Analytic/Synthetic / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary
19. Language / G. Interpretation / 2. Indeterminacy
Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely