Ideas from 'works' by Gottlob Frege [1890], by Theme Structure
Click on the Idea Number for the full details 
back to texts

expand these ideas
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13455

Frege did not think of himself as working with sets

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
16895

The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
3328

Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9179

Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
13473

Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
6076

For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False

3319

Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
9871

Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
16884

Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
3331

If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
16880

Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements

8689

Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
5657

Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. SelfIdentity
3318

Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x'

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16885

To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. SelfEvidence
16887

Frege's concept of 'selfevident' makes no reference to minds

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
16894

An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
16882

The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
5816

Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as TruthConditions
7307

A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7309

Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone

7312

'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
7725

'P or notp' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7316

Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions

28. God / C. Proofs of Reason / 1. Ontological Proof
3307

Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers
