Ideas from 'On Sense and Reference' by Gottlob Frege [1892], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege' by Frege,Gottlob (ed/tr Geach,P. /Black,Max) [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12911-1]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander'
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense'
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone
19. Language / C. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence
19. Language / C. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference
19. Language / C. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves