Ideas from 'On Sense and Reference' by Gottlob Frege [1892], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege' by Frege,Gottlob (ed/tr Geach,P. /Black,Max) [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12911-1]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander'
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 7. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense'
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object
19. Language / B. Meaning / 6. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false
19. Language / C. Semantics / 2. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, as the meaning of a designator, and how its reference is determined
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves