Ideas from 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference' by Graham Priest [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth