Ideas from 'The Structure of Paradoxes of SelfReference' by Graham Priest [1994], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr ) [ ,]].
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13373

Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
13368

The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
13370

'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
13369

By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. BuraliForti's paradox
13366

The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365

Russell's Paradox is a strippeddown version of Cantor's Paradox

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
13367

The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
13371

If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth

13372

There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar
