Ideas from 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' by Harry G. Frankfurt [1971], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Free Will' (ed/tr Watson,Gary) [OUP 1982,0-19-87054-4]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

16. Persons / E. Self as Mind / 6. Self as Meta-awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Free Will / a. Nature of free will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions
A person may be morally responsible without free will