Ideas from 'Causal Powers' by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. [1975], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' by Harré,R/Madden,E.H. [Blackwell 1975,0-631-16040-x]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
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15209
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Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
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15215
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Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
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15212
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Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
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15210
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Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations
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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
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15236
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Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
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15227
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Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
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15273
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Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous'
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
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15274
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Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
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15211
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There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
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15261
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Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
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15268
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Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
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15257
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The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
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15300
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Fundamental particulars can't change
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
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15319
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Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
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15320
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Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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15318
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Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
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15267
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Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations)
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
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15281
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Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
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15279
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Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball
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15276
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Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released
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15305
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Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity)
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
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15218
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Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions
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15302
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We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
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15303
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Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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15258
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Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
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15315
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What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events?
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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15272
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The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
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15304
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We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
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15309
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The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
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15264
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The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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15262
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In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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15297
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We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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15266
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We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
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15220
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To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction
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15222
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Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity
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15296
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A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
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15275
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'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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15271
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If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
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15256
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Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river'
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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15290
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What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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15291
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There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given)
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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15230
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Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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15221
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The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity
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15214
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Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise
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15224
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A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual
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15232
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Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation
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15288
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People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent
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15289
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Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
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15231
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Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature
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15234
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There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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15260
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Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
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15233
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If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary
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15242
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Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
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15216
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Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature?
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15235
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There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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15228
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Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
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15252
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If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
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15245
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It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
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15244
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We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
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15248
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Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
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15269
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Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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15286
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Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse
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15283
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Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities
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15316
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The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
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15298
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We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars
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15225
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Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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15255
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Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions
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15270
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Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
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15284
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Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates
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15285
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The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters
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15287
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The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
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15306
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Only changes require explanation
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
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15293
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If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity
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15294
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Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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15254
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If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour
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15317
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Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
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15310
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Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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15219
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Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
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15301
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The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
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15226
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What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
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15229
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We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
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15292
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We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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15299
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Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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15253
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If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power'
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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15278
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Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
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15246
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Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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15213
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Causation always involves particular productive things
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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15277
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The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
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15237
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Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
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15238
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Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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15223
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Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world
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15241
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Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
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15240
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In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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15239
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We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
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15243
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We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
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15280
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'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped
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15265
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'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
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15321
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Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places
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27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
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15263
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Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2
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15259
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Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum
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28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
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15295
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Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results
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