Ideas from 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion' by Hartry Field [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'New Essays on the A Priori' (ed/tr Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C) [OUP 2000,0-19-924127-9]].

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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct'
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori