Ideas from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Hilary Putnam [1978], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Putnam,Hilary [RKP 1981,0-7100-0437-0]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects
19. Language / A. Language / 7. Private Language
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning
19. Language / B. Meaning / 1. Meaning
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
19. Language / B. Meaning / 6. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
19. Language / G. Interpretation / 2. Indeterminacy
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour
19. Language / G. Interpretation / 3. Charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs