Ideas from 'Representation and Reality' by Hilary Putnam [1988], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Representation and Reality' by Putnam,Hilary [MIT 1992,0-262-66074-1]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 3. Eliminativism
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology?
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same
19. Language / B. Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference
19. Language / B. Meaning / 4. Meaning as Use
"Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning
19. Language / B. Meaning / 9. Meaning Holism
Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible
Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms
Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content
Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts
Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / f. Reference to natural kinds
"Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description