Ideas from 'Critique of Practical Reason' by Immanuel Kant [1788], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Critique of Practical Reason (Third edition)' by Kant,Immanuel (ed/tr Beck,Lewis White) [Library of Liberal Arts 1993,0-02-307753-0]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism
20. Action / B. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil
20. Action / C. Preliminaries of Action / 3. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant?
20. Action / C. Preliminaries of Action / 4. Goal of Action
The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / e. Ultimate value
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 2. Goodness / a. Goodness
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 5. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence
Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 5. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness
22. Metaethics / B. Basis of Ethics / 7. Moral Motives
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
22. Metaethics / C. Sources of Ethics / 6. Ethics from Reason
Only human reason can confer value on our choices
22. Metaethics / D. Consequentialism / 1. Consequentialism
Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions
Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Persons as Ends
Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Motivation for Duty
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 4. Suicide
A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 7. God Reflecting Humanity
In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left
28. God / C. Proofs of Reason / 3. Moral Argument
We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality
Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God)
28. God / D. Proofs of Evidence / 1. Cosmological Proof
To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds
28. God / D. Proofs of Evidence / 3. Teleological Proof critique
Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you
From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones