### Ideas from 'The Philosopher's Toolkit' by J Baggini / PS Fosl [2003], by Theme Structure

#### [found in 'The Philosopher's Toolkit' by Baggini,J and Fosl,P.S. [Blackwells 2003,0-631-22873-x]].

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###### 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
 4643 The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations
###### 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
 4633 You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it
###### 2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
 4635 Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
 4632 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms
 4631 In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use
###### 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
 4638 The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin'
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
 4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y')
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
 4647 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
 4639 Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
 4646 Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. The Cogito
 4641 In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
 4645 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
 4582 Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
###### 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
 4644 A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified
###### 14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
 4584 The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature
###### 14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
 4583 How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
 4634 Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness
 4637 To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations
###### 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Rationality
 4629 Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality