Ideas from 'Causes and Conditions' by J.L. Mackie [1965], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Causation' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Tooley,M.) [OUP 1993,0-19-875094-3]].

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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause