Ideas from 'Mind in a Physical World' by Jaegwon Kim [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind in the Physical World' by Kim,Jaegwon [MIT 2000,0-262-61153-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is linked to dependence
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Intentionality as function seems possible
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia