Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind' by Jaegwon Kim [1996], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Mind' by Kim,Jaegwon [Westview 1998,0-8133-0776-7]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
Experiment requires mental causation
Beliefs cause other beliefs
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Both thought and language have intentionality
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality involves both reference and content
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain has no reference or content
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate
16. Persons / B. Concept of the Self / 3. External Properties
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Content is best thought of as truth conditions
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
Content may match several things in the environment
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
Content depends on other content as well as the facts
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause