Ideas from 'The Coherence Theory of Truth' by James O. Young [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [ ,-]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and the set of proposition with which to cohere
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs?
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere?
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)?
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification