Ideas from 'Realistic Rationalism' by Jerrold J. Katz [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Realistic Rationalism' by Katz,Jerrold J. [MIT 2000,0-262-61151-1]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth
19. Language / C. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way