Ideas from 'The Elm and the Expert' by Jerry A. Fodor [1993], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Elm and the Expert' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1995,0-262-56093-3]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 1. Physicalism
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
Is content basically information, fixed externally?
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
19. Language / B. Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
19. Language / B. Meaning / 6. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
19. Language / B. Meaning / 9. Meaning Holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
19. Language / C. Semantics / 1. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
19. Language / C. Semantics / 4. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)