Ideas from 'Making Mind Matter More' by Jerry A. Fodor [1989], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Theory of Content and other essays' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1994,0-262-56069-0]].

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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?