Ideas from 'Psychosemantics' by Jerry A. Fodor [1987], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Psychosemantics' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1993,0-262-56052-6]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles?
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Lanugage holism
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions