Ideas from 'The Case for Closure' by John Hawthorne [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)' (ed/tr Steup/Turri/Sosa) [Wiley Blackwell 2014,978-0-470-67209-9]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'?
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases