Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind' by John Heil [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Mind' by Heil,John [Routledge 1998,0-415-13060-3]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism
Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Behavioural Dispositions
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 2. Reduction of Mind
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 3. Eliminativism
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 5. Causal Argument
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
19. Language / B. Meaning / 6. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
19. Language / B. Meaning / 9. Meaning Holism
To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
19. Language / E. Propositions / 5. Propositions Critique
If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?