Ideas from 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' by John Perry [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' by Perry,John [MIT 2001,0-262-66135-7]].

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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
19. Language / E. Propositions / 2. Nature of Propositions
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
19. Language / F. Analytic/Synthetic / 1. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought