Ideas from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' by John Searle [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' by Searle,John R. [MIT 1999,0-262-69154-x]].

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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient
Is supervenience just causality?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Undetectable Self
I cannot observe my own subjectivity
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness
If we are computers, who is the user?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
Property dualism denies reductionism
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content'
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
18. Thought / E. Artificial Intelligence / 2. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
19. Language / A. Language / 1. Language
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
19. Language / B. Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality
19. Language / G. Interpretation / 2. Indeterminacy
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
26. Natural Theory / A. Heart of Nature / 2. Natural Purpose
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
26. Natural Theory / A. Heart of Nature / 3. Natural Function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
27. Natural Reality / C. Biology / 3. Evolution
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit